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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PRIOR STATEMENT
OF OPINION FOR PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT
James W. Grady, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

Although impeachment of a non-party witness by means of a prior
contradictory statement of fact has long been permitted,' impeachment
by prior contradictory expressions of opinion has had to overcome much
confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the courts. Generally
stated, the cases prior to 1900 almost universally prohibited impeachment
in this form, while the cases subsequent to that date have increasingly
permitted it to the point where it is now recognized in the great majority
of jurisdictions.
The usual situation in which this question arises is that of a general
statement on the merits of a controversy by a witness who has testified
to facts. Exclusion of such statements in the early cases was only seldom
predicated upon the basis that the opinion was incompetent to contradict
factual testimony. Usually it resulted from a failure on the part of the
courts to comprehend what was at issue, or to appreciate that the proper
consideration in such situations was not that the witness happened to
express an opinion, but having testified to facts, was there in his prior
statement anything sufficiently inconsistent with those facts to cast doubt
upon their accuracy, or the credibility of the witness. If so, then the
matter should have been submitted to the jury. Wigmore pointed this out
in 1904,2 expressing himself in favor of admission under circumstances
where there was within the expressed opinion an implied assertion of fact
inconsistent with the factual testimony. This "inconsistency test" would
appear to be the only logical approach to the problem.
The objects of this study are twofold: first, to chronicle the misconceptions prevalent in the early cases; second, to show the increasing
application of Wigmore's test as the only proper basis for admitting or
excluding such impeaching evidence.
No particular concern is taken herein with the mechanics of impeachment. It is assumed that evidence of the alleged contradictory opinion is
offered solely for impeachment purposes, that the jury is instructed that
it is to be used for this purpose only, and, in those jurisdictions where it
is required, that a proper foundation is laid during the cross-examination of the witness for the introduction of the impeaching evidence.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 241, for biographical data.
1 See cases cited in Annot., 82 Am. St. Rep. 39, 40 (1898).
2 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1041 (1st ed. 1904).
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For the purposes of this discussion, it is of no importance whether the
admissibility of the prior opinion is challenged when the primary witness
is asked whether he expressed the opinion, or whether it is challenged
when independent evidence is introduced to prove that the statement was
in fact made-the primary witness having denied it. The determination of
its admissibility would be the same in both instances.
EARLY CASES

With few exceptions the early cases excluded as improper attempts to
introduce evidence of prior inconsistent statements of opinion made by
a non-party witness for purposes of impeaching that witness. This would
seem to be in accord with the positions taken by Greenleaf in 18421 and
Wharton in 18774 in favor of exclusion. However, an examination of the
cases reveals that in a great percentage of instances the exclusion resulted
from a misconception on the part of the courts as to just what was at
issue. The most frequent error was to regard such evidence as beingoffered on the merits-and to condemn it for its collateral aspect, or its
opinion content.
In Holmes v. Anderson--the earliest New York case directly on this
point-a witness for the plaintiff testified that the defendant had tried
to induce him to burn the plaintiff's barn, that the defendant had told him
he would burn it himself, and that the defendant had left the witness'
house about twelve o'clock the night the barn was burned. The supreme
court of New York held proper the exclusion of evidence that he had
declared he thought the defendant to be innocent. But the exclusion was
predicated upon the ground that the statement was being offered on the
merits, and since it was an opinion, its admission would have been
prejudicial.
Neither was it competent for Charles B. Anderson to give his opinion
upon the case, whether the defendant was guilty or innocent of burning the
barn. His opinion on oath could not be allowed to prejudice either party,
as evidence in the case, much less, therefore, can his out-door8 statement of
his opinion without oath be allowed to prejudice the party
In Lane v. Bryant,7 the Massachusetts court fell into the same misconception. In an action for damages resulting from a collision, the servant
of the defendant having testified as to his careful management of a team
and carriage, the plaintiff was allowed to prove that after the accident the
3 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 1041 (1st ed. 1842),

1 Wharton, Evidence § 551 (1st ed. 1877).
5 18 Barb. 420 (NY. Sup. Ct Madison County 1854).
6 Id. at 424.
7 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 245 (1857).
4
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servant had stated that the plaintiff was not to blame. This was held to
be error.
Nor was the evidence admissible to contradict the testimony of the defendant's servant. He was asked on cross-examination by the plaintiff's
counsel whether he did not excuse the plaintiff from blame at the time of
the accident. His answer to this question could not be coiitradicted by the
plaintiff. It was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue. The opinion of
the witness on the subject was incompetent. The real question was, who
was actually to blame and that was to be determined by the jury by the
facts in the proof. The plaintiff [defendant?] was not bound by the opinion
or declaration of his servant on this question.8
The feeling expressed here that the witness in stating his opinion as to
fault was usurping the function of the jury appears in later cases as one
of the reasons for exclusion. Thus in Ross v. Commonwealth,9 an action
for homicide, a witness for the defendant was asked if she had not said
that the defendant had a bad case, and that it might go hard with him.
Upon her denial, proof was admitted that she had so stated. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in holding this one of the grounds for reversal,
said:
This was error, and very prejudicial to appellant, as it got before the
jury, not the facts of the case, but a mere conclusion of one of appellant's
witnesses as to its merits, when
this was the thing the jury were to try from
0
the evidence before them.'
This was, of course, wide of the real question. The fact that the .witness
happened to express an opinion on the matter ultimately to be determined
by the jury should not bear on the admissibility point. It was not being
introduced for the purpose of helping the jury determine fault, but rather
to aid them in properly evaluating the weight to be accorded the witness's
testimony.
A less frequent basis for exclusion, but one closely allied to the belief
that the opinion was being offered on the merits, was the "original
evidence" test. By this criterion, impeaching evidence of prior statements
was excluded unless the party attempting impeachment could have introduced what was stated as original, or independent, evidence in support of
his plea. On this basis it was argued that since the opinion of the witness
could not be introduced as evidence in a case where opinion was not at
issue, it was improper to use it as a basis for impeachment. It was
automatically rendered collateral by the curse resultant from the fact
that the witness happened to cast his statement in the form of an opinion.
8 Id. at 247.
9 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, 55 S.W. 4 (1900). See also State v. Davidson, 9 S.D. 564, 70 N.W.
879 (1897); Saunders v. City & Suburban Ry., 99 Tenn. 130, 41 S.W. 1031 (1897).
10 Id. at 1347, 55 S.W. at 6.
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In Saunders v. City & Suburban Ry., 11 an action for personal injuries,
the daughter of the plaintiff having testified in his favor, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that she was improperly allowed to be contradicted
by evidence that she had declared that the accident was her father's
fault-she having denied saying so.
: * .the statement on this point attributed to her by Hodges was inadmissible as original evidence for either side, and, being so, it could not properly be made the basis of contradiction or impeachment. . . .An approved test of the question whether or not a fact inquired of in cross-examination is collateral is this: Would the cross-examining party be12 entitled to
prove the fact as a part of, and as tending to establish, his case?
In a few instances the court seemed to appreciate that the prior opinion
was being offered solely for impeachment purposes, and not in any way
upon the merits, but still excluded it upon the general ground that prior
opinions were not competent to contradict facts. The degree of contradiction was of no importance. In Sweeney v. Kansas City Cable Ry., 3
a negligence action for damages for the death of the plaintiff's husband
in a collision between a gripcar and a wagon, a witness having testified to
show the gripman had done nothing to stop the car until the moment of
impact, it was held proper to prevent him from being asked whether he
had not stated at the inquest that he thought the gripman had done all
he could to stop the car.
The rule (that the proof of contradictory statements goes to the credibility of the witness) does not extend so far as to introduce previous
expressions of opinion ....14
The contradiction here was very nearly direct. Only complete obedience to a rule of exclusion could have kept it out.
While the Sweeney case seems plainly wrong in result, many early cases
reached the right result though their reasoning was wrong, or at least
extremely vague. In these cases no contradiction actually existed between
the facts stated in testimony and the opinion previously expressed. But
instead of excluding the attempted impeachment upon this simple ground,
the courts tended to cast a baleful eye on the opinion aspect of the statement and banish it upon that basis. 1'5 Thus in Sloan v. Edwards,8 an
action for assault and battery, a witness for the defendant testified that
he had seen the plaintiff shortly after the incident and there were no
11 99 Tenn. 130, 41 S.W. 1031 (1897).
12 Id. at 139, 41 S.W. at 1034.
13 150 Mo. 385, 51 S.W. 682 (1899).
14.Id. at 400, 51 S.W. at 687. ,
15 See Pruitt v. Miller, 3 Ind. 16 (1851); Rucker v. Beatty, 3 Ind. 70 (1851); Harper
v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. R., 47 Mo. 567,4 Am. Rep. 353 (1871).
16 61 Md. 89 (1883).
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marks or bruises upon his face. It was considered error to allow the plaintiff to impeach him by showing that after the plaintiff had explained the
incident to the witness, a week after its occurrence, the witness had stated
it was a great outrage, and the defendant should be made to pay for it.
There was no contradiction between this opinion and factual testimony
as to absence of bruises on the plaintiff's face. But the error was predicated upon the following ground:
. ..it would seem to be well established, that if a witness has simply
testified to a fact, his previous opinion7as to the merits of the cause, cannot
be regarded as relevant to the issue.'
And consider the ridiculous approach in State v. Davidson.'" This was
a homicide case in which the prosecution, to establish a motive, introduced
facts tending to show a criminal intimacy between the defendant and the
wife of the victim. The defense,-to disprove this theory, introduced witnesses to establish that the alleged intimacy had not occurred. One of
these witnesses was asked, for the purpose of impeaching his testimony,
whether he had not stated that after an investigation of the matter he was
convinced that the defendant had killed the deceased. It was held improper to permit evidence that he had so stated to be introduced after he
had denied it. There can be little quarrel with this result. The opinion of
the witness that the defendant had killed the deceased may have been due
to any number of factors-none of which need have anything to do with
the alleged intimacy. There was no reason why it would be inconsistent
for the witness to believe the defendant guilty of the murder, and at the
same time know him to be innocent of the adultery. But instead of
reaching the result upon this lack of inconsistency, the court runs the
gamut of incorrect reasoning discussed above. There is a hint that the
evidence was being introduced on the merits ("The conclusions that
Hodgkins had arrived at from his investigations were clearly immaterial
to the issue in the case."); the function of the jury was being interfered
with (". . . the jury had no right to know what his conclusions were
after his investigations. Opinions of witnesses as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant are not admissible. . . ."); his statement couldn't have
been offered as independent evidence by the defendant ("His opinion or
conclusion could not have been given in evidence as criminative evidence
by the prosecution. . . ."); an opinion was not competent to contradict
facts ("The rule may be said to be well settled that the statement of the
witness upon which he can be impeached.... must be a matter of fact,
.'9
and not merely a former opinion of the witness...
17 Id. at loS.
18 9 S.D. 564, 70 N.W. 879 (1897).
19 Id. at S67, 568, 571; 70 N.W. at 880, 881.
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One final illustration: in Schell v. Plumb20 the issue was whether a contract to support had been made between the plaintiff and defendant's
testator. A witness for the defendant testified in support of the contention
that there was no contract. The plaintiff was allowed to introduce
evidence that the witness had stated that the plaintiff ought to have
$1,000 out of the estate. The New York Court of Appeals took the position that if this statement were one of fact, the admission was proper; but
if one of opinion, then it was improper-regardless of how contradictory
it might be. 1 With some hesitation, the court concludes that this was a
statement of fact, and thus properly admitted. It is difficult to understand
why the propriety of the impeachment of a witness should depend upon
the label the court places upon his prior statement-particularly in a case
where the distinction was as close as this one. If inconsistency was present, it was present under either characterization-and inconsistency is
the important factor.
While the attitude outlined by the cases discussed above was overwhelmingly the prevalent one, 22 there were some exceptions-notably in
Massachusetts. After an incorrect start in Lane v. Bryant, discussed
previously, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court changed its approach. In Commonwealth v. Mooney,2 3 the attempted impeachment was
held properly excluded-but at least partially upon the ground that the
prior opinion did not contradict the facts. The defendant was charged with
arson, and the witness testified to circumstantial evidence which tended
to show the defendant guilty. He had previously stated he thought the
defendant innocent. The finding that there was no contradiction is subject
to some doubt. 4 But at least the court was more or less sighted upon the
right target. Then in Commonwealth v. Wood,2 5 a criminal action for
overdriving a horse, the mother of the accused was allowed to be impeached by her prior statement that her son was guilty, she having testified that she saw him driving the horse and he was not then overdriving.
This was considered proper.28 Finally, in 1902 came the case of Whipple
20 55 N.Y. 592 (1874).

21 An opinion expressed by a witness upon the merits is inadmissible, though in
conflict with his testimony.
Id. at 599-600.
22 See People v. Stockhouse, 49 Mich. 76, 13 N.W. 364 (1882), where the court, after
expressing a personal inclination in favor of admission, held that the impeaching evidence
should have been excluded on the basis of a rule so "firmly settled by the authorities that
the question cannot be considered an open one."
23 110 Mass. 99 (1872).
24 As pointed out in Whipple v. Rich, 180 Mass. 477, 63 N.E. 5 (1902), discussed infra.
25 111 Mass. 408 (1873).
26 However it is possible that the witness' testimony amounted to the statement of an
opinion--depending upon what was meant by "overdriving a horse." If analogous to the
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v. Rick,27 a tort action in consequence of a collision between a dray and
a railway car. A witness for the plaintiff testified that there was nothing
to obstruct the view of either driver. The defendant, Rich, was allowed
to show that after the accident the witness had stated that Rich's driver
was not to blame. The jury was carefully instructed that this was admitted solely so far as it tended to contradict the witness's testimony.
This procedure was considered proper. After first discounting the "original evidence" objection,2 8 the opinion, with Holmes, C. J., writing, goes
on to set up a standard for admission, with contradiction as the guide.
The question is whether the specific facts testified to lead so directly to
a conclusion that it is obviously unlikely that a man will believe a contrary
conclusion if he believes the specific facts. Different minds will differ more
or less in drawing the line, and it may be that we should have felt some
hesitation with regard to the decision in Commonwealth v. Mooney. But in
in this case fell on the right side of the line, alour opinion the question
29
though pretty near it.

The approach taken by Holmes here is very similar to that taken by Wigmore two years later when his treatise on Evidence was first publishedthough they start at opposite ends. Holmes would take the conclusion
derivative from the factual testimony and compare it with the prior conclusion or opinion stated by the witness. Wigmore, as will be pointed out,
would take the facts implicit in the expressed opinion and compare them
with the facts stated in testimony. Under either method, if inconsistency
appears then evidence of the prior opinion should be admitted.
AFTER

1904

Against the background of the cases just discussed, Wigmore took the
following approach:
A common difficulty is to determine whether some broad assertion, offered
in contradiction, really assumes or implies anything specifically inconsistent
with the primary assertion. The usual case of this kind is that of a general
statement upon the merits of the controversy, which is now offered against
a witness who has testified to a specific matter ....

The usual answer of

some Courts is that the declaration should be excluded because it is mere
speed of a car, the witness' testimony would have amounted to an opinion, and contradic-

tion by her previous contrary opinion wouldn't have been unusual. This is discussed at
page 239 infra.
27 180 Mass. 477, 63 N.E. 5 (1902).
28 But evidence admissible for one- purpose,

if offered in good faith, is not made inadmissible by the fact that it could not be used for another with regard to which it has
a tendency to influence the mind.
Id. at 479, 63 N.E. at 6.
29 Idem.
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opinion. This is unsound, (1) because the declaration is not offered as testimony, and therefore the Opinion Rule has no application, and (2) because
the declaration in its opinion-aspect is not concerned, and is of importance
only so far as it contains by implication some contradictory assertion of
fact. In short, the only proper inquiry can be, Is there within the broad
statement of opinion on the general question some implied assertion of fact
inconsistent with the other assertion made on the stand? If there is, it
ought to be received, whether or not it is clothed in or associated with an
expression of opinion. 30
It will be noted that Wigmore placed inconsistency as the principal test
for admission. He regarded the fact that the statement might happen to
be in the form of an opinion as incidental. From the point of view of
practical application, what this would seem to amount to would be to
make a prior statement of opinion really no different from a prior statement of fact; or, in other words, to make the opinion statement merely one
variation of prior statements. For whether the prior statement be one of
opinion or one of fact the principal test for admissibility is the same-inconsistency. Wigmore, in speaking of the admissibility of prior statements in
general, and without making any distinction between those of fact and
those of opinion, states:
In the present mode of impeachment, there must of course be a real
inconsistency between the two assertions of the witness. The purpose is to
induce the tribunal to discard the one statement because the witness has
also made another statement which cannot at the same time be true. Thus,
it is not a mere difference of statement that suffices; nor yet is31an absolute
oppositeness essential; it is an inconsistency that is required.
In short, whether the statement happens to be one of fact or opinion if
it is inconsistent with the witness's testimony then the jury should have it
for consideration in weighing the veracity of the witness and the accuracy
of his testimony. The argument that an opinion is never competent to
contradict facts is erroneous. A man may express in the form of an
opinion a belief or an implied fact as much at variance with his factual
testimony as would be a contradictory statement of fact. Admittedly an
opinion may be so general that it is not in any real sense contradictory of
the testimony, and admission under such circumstances would serve only
to confuse and possibly prejudice the jury. But such opinions would, or at
least should, be excluded under the inconsistency test. Concededly in
this area there may be room for error and disagreement.32 But such
possible error is minor compared to that committed by those jurisdictions
30 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1041 (1st ed. 1904).
81 2 id. J 1040.
82 See State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1906), where the admission
might be questioned on the ground that no real inconsistency was present.
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which, under a blanket rule of exclusion, would prohibit all statements of
opinion--even those admitted by the court to be directly contradictory.3 4
It is not contended that merely by saying that a statement of opinion
should be admitted if inconsistent, and excluded if not, the problem becomes a simple one. Whether the opinion is inconsistent with the facts
testified to is often a difficult and close question, since an opinion is
generally more tenuous in its implications than a statement of fact.
Wigmore would consider the opinion to be inconsistent if it contained "by
implication some contradictory assertion of fact." By this method the
attempt is made to reduce the opinion statement to a common denominator, so that fact can be compared with implied fact, and the inconsistency,
if any, determined. But this is an explanation of Wigmore's test, rather
than the test itself. It would be equally workable to say that the opinion
should be admitted if it is such that no reasonable man could entertain
it and the facts stated in testimony at the same time.
The task of determining inconsistency must fall initially upon the trial
judge. In this regard he should be guided not by what he himself might
consider inconsistent, but what a reasonable man would consider inconsistent. If this standard is met, then the impeaching evidence should be
given to the jury with proper instructions. In Commonwealth v. Grossman3 5 a witness testifying to the good character of the defendant was
impeached by a showing that after the arrest he had said that it "looked
bad" for the defendant. The existence of an inconsistency here was a
close question. But the jury was carefully instructed that the admission
-was for a limited purpose, and it would be difficult to say that the trial
judge was beyond his discretionary province in allowing the admission.
While the tendency thus far has been to consider cases of admission
as correct, and those of exclusion as incorrect, that is not accurate. Wigmore doesn't declare himself in favor of admission, but only admission
is
under certain circumstances. A case can be wrong where the opinion
37
admitted,3" and correct and well reasoned where it is excluded.
Thus what this paper seeks, and what Wigmore's test implies, is an
approach on the part of the courts in determining the admissibility of a
prior statement of opinion-an approach designed to avoid the misconceptions chronicled in the discussion of the early cases. This requires a
disregard of the opinion aspect of the statement, a realization that it
33 E.g., Missouri, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington.
34 See State v. Thompson, 71 S.D. 319, 24 N.W.2d 10 (1946), discussed infra.
35 261 Mass. 82, 158 N.E. 338 (1927).
36 See Sanders v. H. P. Welch Co., 92 N.H. 74, 26 A.2d 34 (1942), discussed infra.
ST See Smith v. Holyoke St. Ry., 210 Mass. 202, 96 N.E. 135 (1911), and State v. Storrs,
105 Vt. 180, 163 At]. 560 (1933), both discussed infra.
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is not being offered on the merits any more than any prior statement of
fact is offered on the merits, and a focus of attention upon the important
consideration-the determination whether the opinion statement is inconsistent with the facts stated on the stand. To illustrate, suppose
A sues B for damages resulting from a collision between their respective
automobiles. W, a witness for A, testifies to facts tending to establish
A's careful management of his car. B offers to show that subsequent to
the accident W made one of the following statements: (1) "If A hadn't
been driving so recklessly that accident would never have happened";
(2)"A was at fault"; (3) "B was not at fault"; (4) "A is a very careless
person." Of these statements which should be admitted? With the inconsistency test as a guide it is apparent that statement (1) should be admissible because the opinion that A's reckless driving caused the collision would
be incompatible with the testimony of W tending to show that A was
driving carefully. Statement (2) presents almost as clear a case for admission, though the "at fault" opinion is not as directly contradictory of the
careful management testimony as the reckless driving statement. Statement (3) is more difficult of analysis, but should probably be excluded, upon
the ground that W's opinion as to B's freedom from fault isn't sufficiently
contradictory of testimony tending to show that A was driving carefully
-since the accident could well have resulted from the act of a third
person, or from factors beyond the control of either party.3 8 Statement (4)
should be excluded because W's general opinion that A was a careless person
wouldn't be incompatible with the fact that he observed A driving carefully on this particular occasion, and testified accordingly.
The majority of the early cases would have excluded all of these statements-for one or more of the reasons already discussed. The result as
far as statements (3) and (4) are concerned would, as it happens, be the
same as under the inconsistency test. The difficulty is that the same
incorrect reasons would also exclude (1) and (2), which would be admissible on the inconsistency basis-and properly so.
It would be encouraging but incorrect to say that Wigmore's test, and
the approach implicit in it, has been universally adopted by the courts,
and the confused reasoning of the early cases discarded. Precedent has
continued to prevail in some jurisdictions; and the same incorrect reasons
are still often made the basis for exclusion. In Bright v. Wheelock3" and
88 Though possibly the better procedure in such a situation would be to admit the statement subject to explanation on the part of W. 1
39 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W.2d 684, 66 A.L.R. 263 (1929) (witness testified that pin lifter
on engine in question was not enclosed in a gas pipe; impeachment was attempted upon the
basis of his opinion that certain photographs correctly represented the pin lifter on the
engine in question, and that such photographs showed the pin lifter to be enclosed in a gas
pipe).
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Webb v. City of Seattle40 the question was discussed at some length in
support of exclusion, and the cases of each jurisdiction reviewed. But
the sum total of the discussion was that Missouri and Washington, respectively, had always excluded statements of opinion and would continue
to do so. No attempt was made to determine the degree of inconsistency,
since both decisions quote from 40 Cyc. 2712 to the effect that expressions
of opinion should be excluded even though they are "wholly inconsistent
with the facts testified to." Wigmore is not mentioned.
In McDougal v. State41 the contradiction was very nearly direct. The
wife of the defendant testified to facts tending to show that the deceased
was the aggressor. It was shown that shortly after the incident she told
the son of the deceased: "Ira killed your papa because he sued him; I
tried to keep him from it but I couldn't do it." Yet this was held to be
improper impeachment. The reasoning of the court is very confused. The
gist is that such evidence was being improperly offered on the merits,
and Texas cases have always excluded such statements of opinion. In
Wagnon v. Brown4 2 the inconsistent opinion was excluded upon the ground
that the province of the jury was being interfered with. And in State v.
Thompson4 3 the exclusion was predicated upon the danger of the jury
misusing such impeaching evidence-though the clear contradiction was
conceded by the court, and prior statements of fact were admitted without
any concern about misuse."
As was true in the early cases, in many instances the exclusion was
proper because in fact the prior opinion was not contradictory. But the
excluding reasons were the incorrect ones previously mentioned.45
But though Wigmore's test was ignored in the above instances, it has
40

22 Wash.2d 596, 157 P.2d 312, 158 A.L.R. 810 (1945)

(witness for plaintiff sought

to be impeached by statement that plaintiff was at fault).
41 81 Tex. Crim. 179, 194 S.W. 944 (1917).
42 169 Okla. 292, 36 P.2d 723 (1934) (witness for defendant sought to be impeached
by statement to plaintiff after the accident: "...
you will get something out of this, or you
ought to.").
43 71 S.D. 319, 24 N.W.2d 10 (1946). The wife of the defendant testified that he was
with her at the time the alleged rape took place. Impeachment was attempted upon the
basis of statements made by her to the girl's mother carrying with them her opinion that
her husband was guilty.
44 The argument used to support the admission of such statements of fact-that the
danger of the jury misusing them had to be risked-would seem to apply equally well to
statements of opinion where the inconsistency was clear.
45 Cottom v. Klein, 123 Ohio St. 440, 175 N.E. 689 (1931)
(opinion incompetent to
establish issue of negligence); Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Meredith, 45 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) (precedent); Hankins v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 520, 146 S.W.2d 195 (1940)
(precedent). In Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N., 158 (1929), the
exclusion was both upon the ground that the function of the jury was being interfered with,
and that no inconsistency was present.
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been increasingly accepted elsewhere. In Holder v. State4" the defendant
was accused of murdering his father. His mother gave testimony tending
to support his alibi. She was impeached by a showing that after the
shooting she said: "Is it possible that I have raised a boy that would kill
his father?" The Tennessee court held such impeachment proper, citing
section 1041 of Wigmore. Though the statement was in the form of an
opinion it "necessarily implied a contradiction in fact of her subsequent
statement on the witness stand that her son was in her presence at the
time of the murder." This result seems completely sound. Yet Tennessee
had previously adhered to a rule of exclusion under which the impeachment here would have been considered improper. A not altogether successful attempt is made in this case to reconcile the result in Saunders
v. City & Suburban Ry., previously discussed, with this rule on the
ground that the stated opinion in that case was not inconsistent, and
therefore the exclusion was correct, though admittedly for the wrong
47

reason.

In Smith v. Holyoke St. Ry., 48 a witness for the plaintiff testified
that he did not hear the defendant's motorman ring his bell until just before
the collision. Impeachment was attempted on the ground that after the
accident he'd said to the conductor, ". .

it is no fault of you people."

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held the exclusion of this
evidence proper after determining that it failed to meet the following
requirement:
But the test is not whether there is a pointed contradiction between the
testimony and the statement made on another occasion. It is enough if an
opinion has been expressed by a witness, which is so incompatible with the
facts he has testified to as a witness, that an honest
4 9 mind, knowing the
facts, would not be likely to entertain the opinion.
Though Wigmore is not mentioned, the similarity between this approach
and his is readily apparent.
The approach of the New York cases has been excellent. In Judson
v. Fieldinge0 a witness testifying to the illegal position of a bus in the road
was impeached by his statement after the accident "that the bus was not
to blame." The fact that this was an opinion was considered not impor46 119 Tenn. 178, 104 S.W. 225 (1907).
47 See also King v. Leeman, 204 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. App. 1946), where the court

attempts to tread a thin line between the Holder and Saunders cases. Wigmore's test is
applied, and the prior opinion is excluded on the basis of lack of inconsistency. But the
result is questionable.
48 210 Mass. 202, 96 N.E. 135 (1911).
49 Id. at 205, 96 N.E. at 136.
50 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N.Y. Supp. 348 (3d Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 596, 171

N.E. 798 (1930).
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tant, since it was entirely incompatible with his testimony. Wigmore is
cited with approval, and his test used to determine inconsistency. The
inconsistency established, the jury was entitled to the impeaching evidence. 5 In Wolfe v. Madison Ave. Coach Co.52 a bus driver was impeached by his statement that the accident was all his fault, having
previously testified to his careful operation of the bus. Wigmore is cited
in support of the propriety of this impeachment, the inconsistency having
been determined. The court shows a complete understanding of the
problem.
The statement is not received as expressing the opinion of the driver.
The declaration is not offered as substantive testimony; it is not received
as an admission of the driver's liability which would in no event be binding
on his employer. It is used as a statement inconsistent with the entire line
of testimony given by the driver on direct examination, to the effect that he
had acted as a prudent cautious operator of the bus and is to be considered
only insofar as it tended to impeach his credibility as a witness. 53
In Crawford v. Commonwealth54 the Kentucky court, following the
correct approach, upholds the impeachment of a witness testifying in
support of a murder charge by his prior statement that: "Caney had to
kill Bill Lawson to keep from getting killed himself." Conceding such
statement to be one of opinion, it was "based by implication on a fact
or set of facts entirely inconsistent with the testimony given by Johnson
as to how the killing took place. . . . The appellant, then, had a right
to introduce it to affect the credibility of Johnson."55 To this should be
added the excellent discussion in Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines,56
where inconsistency is held to be the key to admission.57
51 In considering the evidence so sharply in dispute the jury was entitled to know the

contrary views the witness had expressed . . . the jury should have all the facts in
making an appraisement of the value and weight to be given the testimony.
Id. at 433, 237 N.Y. Supp. at 352.
52 171 Misc. 707, 13 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1939).
53 Id. at 710, 13 N.Y.S.2d at 744. See also the excellent discussions in Burke v. Borden's
Condensed Milk Co., 98 App. Div. 219, 90 N.Y. Supp. 527 (2d Dep't 1904), and in Larkin v.
Nassau Electric R.R., 205 N.Y. 267, 98 N.E. 465 (1912). The latter case also presents
in some detail the mechanics involved in introducing the impeaching evidence.
54 235 Ky. 368, 31 S.W.2d 618 (1930). See also the well reasoned, earlier Kentucky
case, Rockport Coal Co. v. Barnard, 210 Ky. 5, 273 S.W. 533 (1925).
55 Id. at 372, 31 S.W.2d at 620.
58 135 Kan. 40, 10 P.2d 33 (1932) (witness for the plaintiff impeached by his prior
statement that the driver of a third car was responsible for the accident).
57 Of interest is State v. Moore, 135 Kan. 164, 9 P.2d 653 (1932), decided subsequent
to the Leinbach case but in the same month. A witness testifying in support of a plea of
self-defense was impeached by his prior statement: "I have studied about this matter and it
is just cold-blooded murder." The court held the impeachment proper, but went to some
length to make the statement one of fact rather than opinion. It is difficult to see why the
reasoning of the Leinbach case was ignored in favor of this approach.
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Of interest in another aspect is State v. Storrs,58 where Wigmore is used
as a guide to exclusion. The defendant was charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. The officer
who placed him under arrest, but who had not removed him from his
car nor seen him in it, testified for the state. On cross-examination he
was asked whether he had not stated that he "had no evidence to show
that the respondent had been operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor." This question was excluded. The Vermont court,
using the inconsistency test, held the exclusion proper.
But, of course, there must, in any event, be something in the witness's
testimony with which the claimed statement is inconsistent. In this instance
the inspector had given no evidence as to the acts of the respondent regarding the operation of the automobile which have been made the basis of this
proceeding. .

.

. The question, therefore, called for an answer, which, if in

the affirmative, would not contradict the witness's testimony.59
In a few instances, Wigmore's test is used to reach a questionable
result. In Sanders v. H. P. Welch Co.,60 the driver of the plaintiff's car
was sought to be impeached by his prior plea of guilty to a charge of
reckless driving in connection with the same accident. The rejection of
this by the trial court was considered to be error, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court feeling that it contradicted the "general drift" of the
witness' testimony. Undoubtedly some element of contradiction was
present. But a man may plead guilty to such a charge for reasons known
to himself alone, while yet considering himself innocent. At least it
does not stand upon the same footing as an opinion expressed voluntarily
and spontaneously."1
In many cases, though Wigmore is not mentioned, the basis for admission is the approved one of inconsistency. Particularly noteworthy in
63
this respect are Bates v. State, 2 Denver City Tramway Co. v. Lomovt,
and Hanton v. Pacific Electric Ry.64 In others the reasoning is less
clear, but the approach is substantially the same. 5
58 105 Vt. 180, 163 Atl. 560 (1933).

59 Id. at 186, 163 AtI. at 563.
60 92 N.H. 74, 26 A.2d 34 (1942).
61 See also Salvo v. Market St. Ry., 116 Cal. App. 339, 2 P.2d 585 (1931), which is

subject to the same objection (witness impeached by evidence of her pending action charging
proponent with negligence).
62 4 Ga. App. 486, 61 S.E. 888 (1908)

(witness in support of murder charge impeached

by statement containing opinion defendant not guilty).
63 53 Colo. 292, 126 Pac. 276 (1912) (witness for defendant impeached by statement
that defendant's motorman ought to be lynched).
64 178 Cal. 616, 174 Pac. 61 (1918) (witness who testified that car didn't start moving
until after plaintiff reached it, impeached by prior opinion that it must have been moving
before he could have gotten to it).
65 See Powell Bros. Truck Lines v. Barnett, 196 Ark. 1082, 121 S.W.2d 116 (1939);
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The increasing adoption of Wigmore's test to the point where it is now
the prevalent approach is reflected by the recent decisions in which this
point has been at issue. Of four recent cases, three66-Atlantic Greyhound
Corporationv. Eddins,6 7 Southern PassengerMotor Lines, Inc. v. Burks,6 8
and Crowley v. Dix69-- cite Wigmore and use the inconsistency test as a
guide.
Of particular interest is the Atlantic Greyhound case, where the court
faced the unique problem of an opinion expressed at a time when the
witness was not in possession of all the facts stated in testimony. Wigmore's test is approved and exclusion by the trial court is held proper,
upon the ground that there was no contradiction involved in view of the
increased knowledge on the part of the witness.
In the Burks and Crowley cases the impeachment involved the plaintiff
as a witness, which is technically beyond the scope of this paper. But
the evidence of the prior opinion was offered for impeaching purposes, and
its admission was predicated upon that basis. Wigmore is cited and approved in both cases. In the Burks case the plaintiff was injured when
the taxicab in which he was riding collided with a parked car. His testimony was to the effect that the cab driver was negligent. The defense
was prohibited from showing that after the accident he had said it was not
the cab driver's fault. The exclusion was one of the grounds for reversal
-the court considering such evidence proper to contradict the plaintiff's
contrary testimony. In the Crowley case the facts were very similar.
The plaintiff was a passenger in a pleasure car involved in a collision with
a taxi. His suit was against his host, and his testimony was to the effect
that his host had been negligent. The trial court permitted impeachment
by his statement that the accident was due entirely to the fault of the taxi
driver and not to that of his host. This was sustained on the ground that
such an opinion was "indicative of an attitude inconsistent" with his
testimony.
State v. Baker, 233 Iowa 745, 8 N.W.2d 248 (1943); DeBose v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. 549,
197 Pac. 176 (1921); Richie v. Pittman, 144 Ore. 228, 24 P.2d 328 (1933); Weilbacker v.
Rudlin, 125 NJ.L. 631, 17 A.2d 538 (1941).
In Yessler v. Dodson, 104 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), the impeaching evidence is
excluded, partly on the basis of precedent, and partly on a lack of inconsistency. The
decision implies that in a case where inconsistency was present, admission would be proper.
No other Texas case has adopted this criterion, however.
66 The fourth, Ford v. Dahl, 360 Mo. 437, 228 S.W.2d 800 (1950), follows the Missouri
rule of blanket exclusion. Wigmore is mentioned, but summarily dismissed in favor of
precedent.
67 177 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1949).
68 187 Va. 53, 46 S.E2d 26 (1948).
69 136 Conn. 97, 68 A.2d 366 (1949).

1956]

PRIOR STATEMENT OF OPINION

One aspect of this problem which has been disregarded until now is
the use of a prior contradictory opinion to impeach testimony which
amounts to an expression of opinion. The opinion testimony may be that
of an expert, 70 or it may be a layman testifying to the speed of an automobile, 71 the capacity to make a will,72 the strength of beer, 73 or the value
of services. 4 This is permitted everywhere. 75 Just as a prior statement
of fact can be used to contradict factual testimony, the courts have had
no hesitation about permitting a prior statement of opinion to contradict
opinion testimony. 76 But this is the "a fortiori" situation insofar as this
discussion is concerned only because the comparison of prior opinion with
testified opinion renders the contradiction more readily apparent than in
the prior opinion versus testified fact situation.
CONCLUSION

It has not been the object of this paper to show that in any particular
instance the admission or exclusion of this type of impeaching evidence
was correct or incorrect. Rather it has been sought to indicate what is
considered to be the correct approach to the problem: that prior statements of opinion should be accorded the same treatment as prior statements of fact, both being admissible for impeachment purposes if sufficiently inconsistent with the testimony of the witness to warrant the
consideration of the jury.77 Most jurisdictions have in varying degrees

come to this position.78
70 McGrath v. Fash, 244 Mass. 327, 139 N.E. 303 (1923) (doctor's opinion as to extent
of injuries).
71 Langan v. Pianowski, 307 Mass. 149, 29 N.E.2d 700 (1940).
72 Griffin v. Barrett, 185 Ga. 443, 195 S.E. 746 (1938).
73 Commonwealth v. Moinehan, 140 Mass. 463, 5 N.E. 259 (1886).
74 Dalton's Appeal, 59 Mich. 352, 26 N.W. 539 (1886).
75 All Courts, however, concede that expert opinions, as well as other opinions ordinarily
admissible, if inconsistent with those expressed on the stand, are receivable.
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
76 Of course, if the two opinions are reconcilable then the inconsistency test would prevent
admission. In Myers v. Manlove, 164 Ind. 128, 71 N.E. 893 (1904), the witness testified
that the testatrix was of sound mind when she last saw her, a year before the making of the
will. Evidence was admitted that after the death of the testatrix the witness stated that
judging from the face of the instrument she was not capable of making a will. This was
held improper. The passage of time between the two periods involved made the opinions
not inconsistent.
77 For a very recent statement in favor of the inconsistency test, see McCormick, Evidence
1 35 (1954).
78 California has done so by code. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) 1 2052 (Deering
1946): "A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times,
statements inconsistent with his present testimony. . . ." (the remainder pertains to laying
the foundation). No differentiation is made between statements of fact and of opinion.
Annotation B.9 to § 2052 (Deering 1946), specifically includes opinions.
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Admittedly the presence of a requisite degree of contradiction is more
difficult to determine where opinion is concerned. The trial judge, who
must make the initial determination, is of necessity given a large discretion
ii this matter. The correctness of the exercise of this discretion is something about which men may differ. But this is a reason only for the
exercise of great care, and not for the use of a different approach.
While Wigmore's test encourages admission, impeachment by this
method should remain a cautious thing. Promiscuous admission would
be little better than blanket exclusion. Though there has been no hint of
it in the cases thus far, it would be unfortunate if in the future admission
should be permitted without careful consideration of the prior opinion,
-on the theory that lack of inconsistency can be made apparent through
rehabilitation. Any attempt to explain an opinion couched in emotional
terms, for instance, may be completely inadequate. Denver City Tramway v. Lomovt should serve as a model in such situations. The statement of the witness, Murray, that the motorman ought to be lynched
carried with it the implication that the motorman was at fault, and was
sufficiently at variance with his testimony to make admission proper. But
the form of the expression was much more dramatic than a simple statement as to fault. Admission of opinions expressed in such form, without
the careful consideration in regard to the inconsistency factor given in
the Lomovt case, might well leave the proponent of the witness with an
insuperable task of explanation.
The only conformity proper in connection with impeachment of this
type is conformity of approach. It should matter little in any given
jurisdiction whether the previous decisions have predominantly admitted
or excluded such opinions. The particular circumstances of each individual case are all important. A prior opinion may bear heavily upon the
accuracy of the facts testified to, or it may cast little or no doubt upon
their accuracy. Admission or exclusion should rest upon that criterion
alone.

